I expanded and added some more information regarding "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and especially in the section of "Final break down of the agreement"
You can also check the final page in the following link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework_between_the_United_States_of_America_and_the_Democratic_People's_Republic_of_Korea#Final_break_down_of_the_agreement
Bold contents in the following text are what I added three days ago, and it is still untouched.
==Final break down of the agreement==
In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program [21]. Both parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program [22]. The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded denying North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time [23] [24] [25]. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.
The HEU intelligence that James Kelly’s accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on November 19, 2002, there was “clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility” and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported might have been enough for an experimental program or a laboratory, but not enough to be a weapons-grade program. [26]
KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the U.S. Congress would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.
In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers’ facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.
On January 10, 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [27] On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence" [28]. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test. US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.
Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [29], which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. preemptive nuclear strikes. [30] [31] [32]
Although the agreement has largely broken down, as of 2005 North Korea has not restarted work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yeongbyeon plutonium complex for eight years From 1994 to December, 2002. [33]
Discussions are taking place through the Six-party talks about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on September 19, 2005. The accord makes no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework. [34]. This has been followed up by the February 13, 2007 agreement which has largely adopted this Sep 19 statement. Its implementation has been successful so far, with only a slight delay being recorded due to an issue of funds being unfrozen by the US actually reaching North Korea.
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<1> HEU intelligence
"The HEU intelligence that James Kelly’s accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on November 19, 2002, there was “clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility” and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported might have been enough for an experimental program or a laboratory, but not enough to be a weapons-grade program."
=> I would like to mention the controversy over the HEU issue which was a key to the dismantlement of the Agreed Framework.
David Albright’s report that I added was very important source for assessing the degree of the HEU program in the North.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf
<2> North Korea’s blame against the U.S. for the dismantlement of the Agreed Framework
"North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. preemptive nuclear strikes."
=> North Korea’s blame against the U.S. was not just the delay of the light water reactor construction. I think the top priority of North Korea is the security concern and regime survival. Therefore they are extremely sensitive about the remarks such as the Axis of Evil and NPR report which mentioned North Korea as a possible nuclear target. The statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea “Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for.” On Oct 25, 2002 <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#4> clearly stated this problem.
I also added the source of W Bush’s state of the Union address and NPR report:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, January 8, 2002.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
<3> Effectiveness of the Agreed Framework
"The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yeongbyeon plutonium complex for eight years From 1994 to December, 2002."
=> I would like to empathize that the Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yeongbyeon plutonium complex for eight years at least from 1994 to December, 2002, from the establishment of the Agreed Framework to the Second Nuclear Crisis.
We can find same argument in Selig Harrison’s speech in the Korean Ambassy.
<http://www.dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison>
I wanted to question if the decision to stop heavy oil shipment was realistic and effective decision.
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