Conference: "Korean NGO Activities and Perspectives: Peace, Human Rights and Civic Participation"
Thursday, April 26 (more information avaialbe: here)
Opening Speech (9:45 am - 10:15 am): Won-Soon Park, Attorney and Executive Secretary, Hope Institute, "Korean Civic Movement"
Session I (10:15 am - 12:15 pm): Peace and Korean NGOs
- Wooksik Cheong, Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea and George Washington University, "Two Koreas and the United States: Another Future is Possible"
- Bo Geun Kim, Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture and Columbia University), "A Survey: Knowledge of North Korea Among NGOs in the United States and South Korea"
- Jaehun Choi, Imagination for International Solidarity and British Columbia University, Canada, "Unleashed Overseas Dispatch of South Korean Troops: Why Should We Go There?"
- Discussant: John Feffer, Co-Director, Foreign Policy in Focus and Director of Global Affairs, International Relations Center
Keynote Speech (1:15 pm - 1:45 pm): Don Oberdorfer, Chairman, The U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, "New Triangle: Two Koreas and the U.S. in the 21st Century: Prospects and the NGO's Role"
Session II (1:45 pm -3:15 pm): Human Rights and Korean NGOs
- Seung Chang Ha, Citizens' Action Network and Columbia University, "Immigration Problems as the Upcoming Agenda in Korea"
- Mi Sun Kim, Migrant Workers Health Association in Korea and Stanford University, "Advocacy Networks for (Im)migrant's Rights in the U.S. (Bay Area) and Korea - Strategies, Gains, and Challenges for the Networks"
- Sooji Lee, Research Institute of the Differently Abled Person's Rights in Korea and British Columbia University, Canada, "The Rights of Differently Abled Persons in the U.S."
- Yuseok Chung, Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center and Indiana University, "The Anti-Sexual Violence Movement in Korea : Achievements and Limits of the Feminist Law Reform Movement"
Session III (3:30 pm - 5:00 pm): Civic Participation and Korean NGOs
Session III (3:30 pm - 5:00 pm): Civic Participation and Korean NGOs
- Il Pyo Hong, Institute for Participatory Society and George Washington University, "How U.S. Think Tanks Influence Policy-making: Comparing Progressive and Conservative Think Tanks"
- So Yeun Kim, Citizens' Movement for Environmental Justice and Indiana University, "Problems of Conflict Resolution and the NGO’s Role for Civic Participation in South Korea"
- Doo Hyon Choi, Korea Federation for Environments, Jeonju and Stanford University, "Social Capital in the U.S. as Compared to South Korea"
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Visiting Scholar Roundtable: "Between the Collapse of Japanese Empire and Normalization with East Asian States: Repatriations, Reparations, and Memories Reconsidered"
Speaker: Toyomi Asano, Professor of Chukyo University.
Thursday, May 3, 3:00-4:15pm
Saturday, April 14, 2007
INTERESTING NOGUN-RI DEVELOPMENT
According to this AP Report, the Pentagon ignored (whether deliberately or inadvertently is a matter of debate) a key piece of evidence regarding American military orders in the chaotic early days of the Korean War.
KN misses deadline
North Korea has missed the deadline for shutting down Yongbyon and allowing UN inspectors back in.
It is unclear exactly where the hold up is, except to say that the North is holding to its line that it will make progress when the funds issued resolution becomes a reality, and the US continues to say that North Korea is free to takes its money now.
In an uncharacteristic show of common front with the rest of the Six Parties, South Korea has refused to ship the 50,000 tons of HFO. Although, in my cynical mind I see some poor South Korean tanker captain waiting with his ship out in the Sea of Japan just south of the NLL, unable to return to port in the event that the North does make the slightest step of progress, so that the ROK government can deliver the fuel instantaneously.
Ah well. Maybe we'll see some action after the celebrations over the next two weeks (KIS birthday and KWP anniversary). From open source images of the parade practices, it looks to be quite a show!
It is unclear exactly where the hold up is, except to say that the North is holding to its line that it will make progress when the funds issued resolution becomes a reality, and the US continues to say that North Korea is free to takes its money now.
In an uncharacteristic show of common front with the rest of the Six Parties, South Korea has refused to ship the 50,000 tons of HFO. Although, in my cynical mind I see some poor South Korean tanker captain waiting with his ship out in the Sea of Japan just south of the NLL, unable to return to port in the event that the North does make the slightest step of progress, so that the ROK government can deliver the fuel instantaneously.
Ah well. Maybe we'll see some action after the celebrations over the next two weeks (KIS birthday and KWP anniversary). From open source images of the parade practices, it looks to be quite a show!
Friday, April 13, 2007
ROC POWs in the Korean War
The issue of POWs in the Korean War reminded me of the World Freedom Day (January 23) in Taiwan. The KMT politicians have been organizing an event for that day every year to celebrate the return of Taiwanese POWs during the Korean War (I don't remember which year, but either in 1951 or 1952). The responsibility is now taken care of by an organization called "World League for Freedom and Democracy," a KMT-affiliated NGO. This organization was originally established as "The Anti-Communist League" by Chiang Kai-Shek and Syngman Rhee. Its mission and function are controversial (see wikipedia). It changed its name and mission several times as well as experienced internal splits and power struggles under the new DPP regime. Since the time when it was still called the Anti-Communist League, the organization has been having strong connections with many American (mostly Republican) politicians, too. Many of the ROC POWs now live in KMT's veteran retirement homes. I am planning to interview them sometime in the near future.
I have lots of documents about this organization because.... I once worked for them in Taiwan (but believe me, I have a very different ideology from them)!!
I have lots of documents about this organization because.... I once worked for them in Taiwan (but believe me, I have a very different ideology from them)!!
Korean Central News Agency
To my knowledge, no one has posted yet about the Korean Central News Agency website, the state-run news agency of the DPRK (and official mouthpiece of the Korean Worker's Party!), so here it is.
While it is probably inadvisable to rely on it as a credible news source, I believe that it does provide a small window into the thinking of the regime in Pyongyang. On the one hand, it illustrates some of the propoganda tactics used on the North Korean people. For instance, roughly every third article discusses how some figure in the international community recently praised the wonderous accomplishments of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. The theme of the outside world looking in (NOT due to security concerns) is also prevalent.
On the other hand, I think the occasional article also speaks to the attitudes of the leadership as well. For example, before the 6 Party Talks resumed earlier this year, I recall reading a number of news feeds condemning U.S. imperialism and hypocrisy, etc. Now however, a recent story discusses "achieving peace and implementing the socio-economic tasks" on the Korean peninsula. While a small indicator, I don't think it is completley negligible.
Anyway, I just wanted to share this with anyone who hasn't seen it before. I think it mostly interesting (and moderately amusing) to read through the propoganda pieces. Then again, I guess I can't refute that Cambodia and India recently celebrated the Day of the Sun. Whether or not the language accurately reflects sentiment in the regime however, is up for debate.
While it is probably inadvisable to rely on it as a credible news source, I believe that it does provide a small window into the thinking of the regime in Pyongyang. On the one hand, it illustrates some of the propoganda tactics used on the North Korean people. For instance, roughly every third article discusses how some figure in the international community recently praised the wonderous accomplishments of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. The theme of the outside world looking in (NOT due to security concerns) is also prevalent.
On the other hand, I think the occasional article also speaks to the attitudes of the leadership as well. For example, before the 6 Party Talks resumed earlier this year, I recall reading a number of news feeds condemning U.S. imperialism and hypocrisy, etc. Now however, a recent story discusses "achieving peace and implementing the socio-economic tasks" on the Korean peninsula. While a small indicator, I don't think it is completley negligible.
Anyway, I just wanted to share this with anyone who hasn't seen it before. I think it mostly interesting (and moderately amusing) to read through the propoganda pieces. Then again, I guess I can't refute that Cambodia and India recently celebrated the Day of the Sun. Whether or not the language accurately reflects sentiment in the regime however, is up for debate.
Thursday, April 12, 2007
US-Korea Relations and the Documentary Evidence
Diana posted about other documents from the Cold War International History Project, which reminded me of other resources I've utilized to understand issues like this, specifically, the Foreign Relations of the United States. I was hoping for the volumes on the Korean war, during the Truman administration and the Eisenhower Administration to be online, but as far as I can tell, they are not posted electronically, though I remember one of the pieces we read for yesterday referencing FRUS. I did continue looking, though, and am including those that do have something to do with Korea:
Kennedy Administration
Johnson Administration, including a section about Korea-Japan relations also Japan and China for those interested.
Those are the only ones that, on their face, deal with Korea. (For the China people, there's this one on the opening to China.) Others discuss general economic policy, trade policies, and other things, throughout the different administrations. A complete index of the available FRUS volumes is here.
Kennedy Administration
Johnson Administration, including a section about Korea-Japan relations also Japan and China for those interested.
Those are the only ones that, on their face, deal with Korea. (For the China people, there's this one on the opening to China.) Others discuss general economic policy, trade policies, and other things, throughout the different administrations. A complete index of the available FRUS volumes is here.
Social Movements and Legislation in South Korea
There was a talk today in the Sigur Center by a visiting South Korean sociologist, Ilpyo Hong, who looks at social movements and their effect on the South Korean government. Dr. Hong had some interesting points about social movements in South Korea. They are powerful, and credible, held in higher respect in many cases than the bureaucracy or politicians. They are often seen as more moral and more effective. Dr. Hong seemed also to think that they were the most effective way, and a necessary way, for the Korean people to express their wishes to the government. He especially emphasized the use of petitions as methods of instituting policy and changing laws. These methods place an emphasis on the media's role in promoting political movements, in other words, what issues are publicized are those that people are motivated on.
He discussed the movements for democracy, emphasizing the broad-based demand for democracy, expressed through a number of organizations that often utilized extreme tactics (he showed a picture of a man self-immolating and, I think, falling off a roof, and another of Lee Han-yeol, mentioned here as a martyr for the democracy cause). Another aspect of interest for our class is that most Korean social movements are national in scope and focus. They do not attempt to modify local policies, seem not to be motivated by local politics (as they often are in the US) but rather by national issues. They have focused on different issues over time, starting with labor and gender issues, and moving, today, to what Dr. Hong called "political" issues, such as matters of institutional reform, corruption, the "purity" of candidates, party reform, and other governance topics.
While Dr. Hong was a very determined supporter of the social movements, he did point out one flaw, that they seriously and consistently weakened the party structure. He pointed to the "black list movement" of judging politicians and attempting to prevent those deemed improper candidates from being elected, as a cause of a siginifcant recent increase in the number of bills put forth by legislators, a change from a large number previously put forth by social movements and citizens movements. To me, this perhaps signifies that peopel are beginning to trust legislators and politicians more, and are allowing them to do their job as legislators, but I do not know enough about the topic to say for certain. Dr. Hong also stated that all of this activity has not only brought forth the progressive groups, but also solidified the conservatives into a functional coalition.
My major questions, in terms of the function of South Korean democracy (however effective you believe it is) is something that I know is driven by my American understanding: that bills and other legislation is originated directly from the people through petition, which is then brought up for discussion just like any other bill. That was my understanding from the talk today, and if I am misunderstanding, I would appreciate any explanation. Given this understanding, to me, this seems odd, Dr. Hong pointed out that this sidelines politicians, emphasizes the media, and national issues. Is it possible that this style of democracy is part of what is driving the centrality of nationalist and historical issues in South Korean politics?
I have many more notes from this talk, so if anyone has any questions or comments, please ask!
He discussed the movements for democracy, emphasizing the broad-based demand for democracy, expressed through a number of organizations that often utilized extreme tactics (he showed a picture of a man self-immolating and, I think, falling off a roof, and another of Lee Han-yeol, mentioned here as a martyr for the democracy cause). Another aspect of interest for our class is that most Korean social movements are national in scope and focus. They do not attempt to modify local policies, seem not to be motivated by local politics (as they often are in the US) but rather by national issues. They have focused on different issues over time, starting with labor and gender issues, and moving, today, to what Dr. Hong called "political" issues, such as matters of institutional reform, corruption, the "purity" of candidates, party reform, and other governance topics.
While Dr. Hong was a very determined supporter of the social movements, he did point out one flaw, that they seriously and consistently weakened the party structure. He pointed to the "black list movement" of judging politicians and attempting to prevent those deemed improper candidates from being elected, as a cause of a siginifcant recent increase in the number of bills put forth by legislators, a change from a large number previously put forth by social movements and citizens movements. To me, this perhaps signifies that peopel are beginning to trust legislators and politicians more, and are allowing them to do their job as legislators, but I do not know enough about the topic to say for certain. Dr. Hong also stated that all of this activity has not only brought forth the progressive groups, but also solidified the conservatives into a functional coalition.
My major questions, in terms of the function of South Korean democracy (however effective you believe it is) is something that I know is driven by my American understanding: that bills and other legislation is originated directly from the people through petition, which is then brought up for discussion just like any other bill. That was my understanding from the talk today, and if I am misunderstanding, I would appreciate any explanation. Given this understanding, to me, this seems odd, Dr. Hong pointed out that this sidelines politicians, emphasizes the media, and national issues. Is it possible that this style of democracy is part of what is driving the centrality of nationalist and historical issues in South Korean politics?
I have many more notes from this talk, so if anyone has any questions or comments, please ask!
more resources on the Korean War
The Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project has more on the North Korea's role in the Korean War. If interested, check out this website.
I was especially interested in Shen Zhihua's article (the second piece), which describes the Sino-North Korean conflict during the War. He talks about that the Chinese leadership did not recieve notification of the attack on South Korea on June 25, and they learned of it from foreign news services; China intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began, but the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so because of the UN advance across the 38th parallel.
Opposite to my thinking.
I was especially interested in Shen Zhihua's article (the second piece), which describes the Sino-North Korean conflict during the War. He talks about that the Chinese leadership did not recieve notification of the attack on South Korea on June 25, and they learned of it from foreign news services; China intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began, but the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so because of the UN advance across the 38th parallel.
Opposite to my thinking.
H.R. 121, Rep. Honda & California's 15th District
Not that I disagree with Rep. Honda’s sponsorship of HR 121, I just became curious about his motivations for sponsoring the resolution. Particularly, I was wondering if this was prompted by constituents or any coalitions in his district. In case anyone else is interested, you can find information on Rep. Honda and on California’s 15th district here.
In general, the 15th district is quite diverse: 29.4% is of Asian heritage (54.7% is white), 33.8% of the population is foreign born, 43.2% speak a language other than English in their home. Geographically, it encompasses much of Silicon Valley. Although Koreans are included in district's demographic description, no Korean or Korean-American organization was included in the list of local organizations.
In terms of his legislative record, he’s quite liberal and is especially known for his commitment to civil rights. Rep. Honda also received a fair amount of attention for his support for Muslim Americans, particularly after September 11.
Specifically pertaining to the comfort women issue, his motivation for sponsoring this legislation seems to be out of a personal commitment to historical reconciliation. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Honda sponsored a measure in the California State Assembly in 1999 which called on Congress to urge the Japanese government to issue an apology for the vicitims of Nanking, comfort women and POWs used as slave laborers. Moreover, his interest takes a more personal note. In his Feb. 15th testimony before the House Foreign Affair Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment on HR 121, he references his expereince as a Japanese-American infant interned during World War II and the power of reconciliation through government actions.
In general, the 15th district is quite diverse: 29.4% is of Asian heritage (54.7% is white), 33.8% of the population is foreign born, 43.2% speak a language other than English in their home. Geographically, it encompasses much of Silicon Valley. Although Koreans are included in district's demographic description, no Korean or Korean-American organization was included in the list of local organizations.
In terms of his legislative record, he’s quite liberal and is especially known for his commitment to civil rights. Rep. Honda also received a fair amount of attention for his support for Muslim Americans, particularly after September 11.
Specifically pertaining to the comfort women issue, his motivation for sponsoring this legislation seems to be out of a personal commitment to historical reconciliation. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Honda sponsored a measure in the California State Assembly in 1999 which called on Congress to urge the Japanese government to issue an apology for the vicitims of Nanking, comfort women and POWs used as slave laborers. Moreover, his interest takes a more personal note. In his Feb. 15th testimony before the House Foreign Affair Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment on HR 121, he references his expereince as a Japanese-American infant interned during World War II and the power of reconciliation through government actions.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
New Prime Minister in North Korea
This article which states that the prime minister of North Korea has been replaced by the former army and navy minister, Kim Yong-il. The problem is, I do not feel I know enough about the internal structure of the DPRK to really understand what that means. The Wikipedia entry on Pak Pong Ju gives very little information about him. He appears to have consistently gone outside Korea, to China and other places.
This article from Asia Times indicates that Pak was considered by outside watchers to be something of a reformer, though in a limited way allowed to him in Pyongyang. However, this article was from about two years ago. I have not managed an exhaustive search, but very little has been written about him which is unsurprising given the secretiveness of his government.
As far as I could tell, nothing is written about his replacement, Kim Yong Il.
Anyone who knows more about how the North Korean government works and wants to speculate on why Pak was removed? Has becoming prime minister, an automatically risky position, simply finally caught up with him? Or is it related to the Six Party Talks? Or simply to continuing economic difficulties? Could he possibly be a threat in the power structure? It will be interesting to see if North Korea gives any indication as to why, and what analysts say about it.
This article from Asia Times indicates that Pak was considered by outside watchers to be something of a reformer, though in a limited way allowed to him in Pyongyang. However, this article was from about two years ago. I have not managed an exhaustive search, but very little has been written about him which is unsurprising given the secretiveness of his government.
As far as I could tell, nothing is written about his replacement, Kim Yong Il.
Anyone who knows more about how the North Korean government works and wants to speculate on why Pak was removed? Has becoming prime minister, an automatically risky position, simply finally caught up with him? Or is it related to the Six Party Talks? Or simply to continuing economic difficulties? Could he possibly be a threat in the power structure? It will be interesting to see if North Korea gives any indication as to why, and what analysts say about it.
30-day extension? It's too long!
We talked about during today's class that North Korea had asked for a further 30 days, beyond Saturday, to close its operational reactor, Yongbyon, but Bill Richardson told North Korean officials that it's too long. See this article.
As the US government had removed the final roadblock by agreeing for $25 million in Banco Delta Asia to be released to its depositors, principally the North Korean government, hopefully we can see the North Korea return American "good faith" by shutting down Yongbyon soon.
As the US government had removed the final roadblock by agreeing for $25 million in Banco Delta Asia to be released to its depositors, principally the North Korean government, hopefully we can see the North Korea return American "good faith" by shutting down Yongbyon soon.
Kim Jong Il's Fashion Makeover
Newsweek apparently had 5 fashion gurus give Kim Jong Il a makeover. There's a slideshow of the pictures. For all that I don't care for Kim Jong Il, I found it offensive that they would treat the leader of a country that way. The Austin Powers one was especially ridiculous.
But you guys check it out and tell me what you think...
But you guys check it out and tell me what you think...
6PT update?
Yes, that was a question. To follow up on Grace's post and my post from the weekend on the 6 Party Talks, it appears that the ball is now in Pyongyang's court.
This article from JoongAng Daily reveals that the U.S. has essentially washed its hands of the frozen funds issue. I'm a bit confused in that I'm not sure this is anything new. At the same time, the article mentions that the "Macao authorities are prepared to unblock all North Korean-related accounts currently frozen in Banco Delta Asia." This language suggests that all funds, not just the "legitimate" ones are now free. If that's the case, that seems like quite a major concession. Later in the article however, it again refers to the $25 million total.
If the $25 million total is still the sum the parties are working with then this is probably just a diplomatic gesture to tell Pyongyang that it must take the initiative and bear responsibility for the progress of the talks. If more funds are now free (which I don't think to be the case, despite some sloppy reporting) that strikes me as being a little too generous. Presuming the former, it will be interesting to see if North Korea will take the necessary steps or go the way that Bolton and co. are predicting.
On different note, if you haven't seen it, I strongly recommend giving the March 31 edition of the Economist a look through. It features roughly 10 articles as part of a survey of China's relations with its Asian neighbors, including one piece entitled "History Wars." It's about the Koguryo controversy. I was pretty impressed by both the article and the survey as a whole, and strongly encourage any China-philes to check it out. I would link it, but it's a subscription-only article, so unless you have a subscription you won't be able to see it. I could e-mail the article to you however if you so desire. Let me know at wbuck@gwu.edu .
This article from JoongAng Daily reveals that the U.S. has essentially washed its hands of the frozen funds issue. I'm a bit confused in that I'm not sure this is anything new. At the same time, the article mentions that the "Macao authorities are prepared to unblock all North Korean-related accounts currently frozen in Banco Delta Asia." This language suggests that all funds, not just the "legitimate" ones are now free. If that's the case, that seems like quite a major concession. Later in the article however, it again refers to the $25 million total.
If the $25 million total is still the sum the parties are working with then this is probably just a diplomatic gesture to tell Pyongyang that it must take the initiative and bear responsibility for the progress of the talks. If more funds are now free (which I don't think to be the case, despite some sloppy reporting) that strikes me as being a little too generous. Presuming the former, it will be interesting to see if North Korea will take the necessary steps or go the way that Bolton and co. are predicting.
On different note, if you haven't seen it, I strongly recommend giving the March 31 edition of the Economist a look through. It features roughly 10 articles as part of a survey of China's relations with its Asian neighbors, including one piece entitled "History Wars." It's about the Koguryo controversy. I was pretty impressed by both the article and the survey as a whole, and strongly encourage any China-philes to check it out. I would link it, but it's a subscription-only article, so unless you have a subscription you won't be able to see it. I could e-mail the article to you however if you so desire. Let me know at wbuck@gwu.edu .
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in South Korea
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Seoul on April 10 (Beijing local time) for a two-day visit. This trip to South Korea is the first visit by a Chinese premier in seven years. See this article for more detail.
It seems the talks are centered on the issues of denuclearization in North Korea and of trade between China and South Korea. But I hope the leaders of the two countries would have some talks on more cultural cooperation. Such as more Korean scholars being allowed to research on the Koguryo tombs.
It seems the talks are centered on the issues of denuclearization in North Korea and of trade between China and South Korea. But I hope the leaders of the two countries would have some talks on more cultural cooperation. Such as more Korean scholars being allowed to research on the Koguryo tombs.
The Korean War
Below is the definition on "the Korean War" given by Encyclopædia Britannica. See if yours would be different based on this week's readings.
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On June 25, 1950, a powerful invading force from the Soviet-supported Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) swept south of the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Within days, President Truman resolved to defend South Korea, even though there were few Americans in Korea and few troops ready for combat. The UN Security Council, acting during a Soviet boycott, quickly passed a resolution calling upon UN members to resist North Korean aggression.
After almost being driven into the sea, UN forces, made up largely of U.S. troops and commanded by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, counterattacked successfully and in September pushed the North Korean forces back across the border. Not content with this victory, the United States attempted to unify Korea by force, advancing almost to the borders of China and the Soviet Union. China, after its warnings were ignored, then entered the war, driving the UN forces back into South Korea. The battle line was soon stabilized along the 38th parallel, and armistice talks began on July 10, 1951, three months after Truman had relieved MacArthur for openly challenging U.S. policies. The talks dragged on fruitlessly, interrupted by outbreaks of fighting, until Eisenhower became president. The United States sustained some 142,000 casualties in this limited war, most of them occurring after China's entry.
In addition to militarizing the Cold War, the Korean conflict widened its field. The United States assumed responsibility for protecting Taiwan against invasion from mainland China. Additional military aid was extended to the French in Indochina. In December 1950 Truman called for a crash program of rearmament, not just to support the forces in Korea but especially to expand the U.S. presence in Europe. As a result defense expenditures rose to $53,600,000,000 in 1953, four times the pre-Korean level, and would decline only modestly after the armistice.
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On June 25, 1950, a powerful invading force from the Soviet-supported Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) swept south of the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Within days, President Truman resolved to defend South Korea, even though there were few Americans in Korea and few troops ready for combat. The UN Security Council, acting during a Soviet boycott, quickly passed a resolution calling upon UN members to resist North Korean aggression.
After almost being driven into the sea, UN forces, made up largely of U.S. troops and commanded by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, counterattacked successfully and in September pushed the North Korean forces back across the border. Not content with this victory, the United States attempted to unify Korea by force, advancing almost to the borders of China and the Soviet Union. China, after its warnings were ignored, then entered the war, driving the UN forces back into South Korea. The battle line was soon stabilized along the 38th parallel, and armistice talks began on July 10, 1951, three months after Truman had relieved MacArthur for openly challenging U.S. policies. The talks dragged on fruitlessly, interrupted by outbreaks of fighting, until Eisenhower became president. The United States sustained some 142,000 casualties in this limited war, most of them occurring after China's entry.
In addition to militarizing the Cold War, the Korean conflict widened its field. The United States assumed responsibility for protecting Taiwan against invasion from mainland China. Additional military aid was extended to the French in Indochina. In December 1950 Truman called for a crash program of rearmament, not just to support the forces in Korea but especially to expand the U.S. presence in Europe. As a result defense expenditures rose to $53,600,000,000 in 1953, four times the pre-Korean level, and would decline only modestly after the armistice.
Monday, April 09, 2007
Deadline Approaching
Well, to make the pessimists happy the 6PT do seem to be at a stalemate over the same issue: money. While the Treasury Dept has withdrawn its complaints regarding the money, China and other international banks seem to be unwilling to take the funds since it has the stigma of laundered money on it. A possible solution that has come up is for the North Korean government to open up a new separate account at the BDA to withdraw the money. If that's the case, I don't see why North Korea can't just withdraw the money immediately since technically the funds have been released. Why would they have to open a new account or go through China then?
The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim also indicated to the Bill Richardson delegation that as soon as they received the funds, they would allow IAEA officials back into the country--with the caveat that shutting down the Yongbyong reactor by Saturday would be "difficult." So I guess we'll have to wait and see what happens at the end of this week. Most likely it will be something like the US-Korea FTA process with a mad scramble at the end to put something together.
On a different note, there was an article on Ethiopia having bought arms from North Korea earlier this year with US consent. It was rather interesting and pointed out the US policy of turning a blind eye to allies who are cooperating with it.
The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim also indicated to the Bill Richardson delegation that as soon as they received the funds, they would allow IAEA officials back into the country--with the caveat that shutting down the Yongbyong reactor by Saturday would be "difficult." So I guess we'll have to wait and see what happens at the end of this week. Most likely it will be something like the US-Korea FTA process with a mad scramble at the end to put something together.
On a different note, there was an article on Ethiopia having bought arms from North Korea earlier this year with US consent. It was rather interesting and pointed out the US policy of turning a blind eye to allies who are cooperating with it.
When the Ice is Melting and Flowers are Starting to Blossom
Brash statements aside, since the new administration has come to power in Japan, Tokyo's relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors appear on the rise. Prime Minister Abe's implicit stance on not visiting the Yasakuni shrine has revitalized the islands' ties within the region and overall, things appear to be on the up.
At the same time, it strikes me that improvements have been largely one-dimensional, in that Japan's relationship with China has been improving significantly, while Tokyo's relationship with Seoul, though better than before, remains comparatively stagnant. It seems that Beijing is making a major effort to improve popular perceptions of Japan. One example that comes to mind is an upcoming CCTV documentary on Japan during the early 20th century, part of an effort to proliferate understanding and a more balanced presentation of the Japanese. Japan seems to be making appropriate strides to do its part, to "face up to its history," with one or two glaring exceptions aside.
The latest chapter in this unbalanced diplomatic initiative is Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan this week, where the two sides will continue to strengthen ties and attempt to make strides in addressing their mutual energy, environmental, and regional security interests.
Perhaps this bias is imagined. Perhaps it is the result of my Sino-centric academic eye. Perhaps it is completely accurate. Can anyone think of any major political strides taken to bolster the Japan-ROK relationship since Abe came to power? Does anyone think that developments in the China-Japan relationship are overstated on my part? Maybe I'm putting too much stock in generic activity. On the other hand, maybe China's economic prowess simply trumps anything Seoul has to offer Japan and Tokyo wants to capitalize.
From a different angle, I wonder if national identities in China and Korea play a role in the openness to developing close relations with Japan. While the two are without a doubt very nationalist, I think that China's nationalism has refocused itself in the present context.
Back in college, everything I read about China was how nationalism drove everything: retribution for a century of humiliation, restoring China to its once great status, etc. Well, guess what? Another decade of economic growth later, China's kinda done that from my perspective. The once somewhat stand-offish rising power, has not only continued to prosper and develop, but it has also begun to craft a role for itself in the international community as a great power. The "China threat" is becoming a "responsible stakeholder" on a "peaceful rise." Now better integrated into the international system, I think that China's nationalism has changed course. It's rise is no longer validated by its need to recover from its historical obstacles, but by its need to continue to develop and grow in the present.
I am not so confident saying the same of Korea's nationalism. This course has suggested to me that ROK remains very much held hostage by its troubled past. Certainly, division provides a demoralizing reminder of this difficult history, but nonetheless, Korea's nationalism, I believe, remains very much rooted in the past. This perhaps makes them less willing than the Chinese to engage Japan now that their neighbour has reached out.
I'm curious to hear what people think.
At the same time, it strikes me that improvements have been largely one-dimensional, in that Japan's relationship with China has been improving significantly, while Tokyo's relationship with Seoul, though better than before, remains comparatively stagnant. It seems that Beijing is making a major effort to improve popular perceptions of Japan. One example that comes to mind is an upcoming CCTV documentary on Japan during the early 20th century, part of an effort to proliferate understanding and a more balanced presentation of the Japanese. Japan seems to be making appropriate strides to do its part, to "face up to its history," with one or two glaring exceptions aside.
The latest chapter in this unbalanced diplomatic initiative is Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan this week, where the two sides will continue to strengthen ties and attempt to make strides in addressing their mutual energy, environmental, and regional security interests.
Perhaps this bias is imagined. Perhaps it is the result of my Sino-centric academic eye. Perhaps it is completely accurate. Can anyone think of any major political strides taken to bolster the Japan-ROK relationship since Abe came to power? Does anyone think that developments in the China-Japan relationship are overstated on my part? Maybe I'm putting too much stock in generic activity. On the other hand, maybe China's economic prowess simply trumps anything Seoul has to offer Japan and Tokyo wants to capitalize.
From a different angle, I wonder if national identities in China and Korea play a role in the openness to developing close relations with Japan. While the two are without a doubt very nationalist, I think that China's nationalism has refocused itself in the present context.
Back in college, everything I read about China was how nationalism drove everything: retribution for a century of humiliation, restoring China to its once great status, etc. Well, guess what? Another decade of economic growth later, China's kinda done that from my perspective. The once somewhat stand-offish rising power, has not only continued to prosper and develop, but it has also begun to craft a role for itself in the international community as a great power. The "China threat" is becoming a "responsible stakeholder" on a "peaceful rise." Now better integrated into the international system, I think that China's nationalism has changed course. It's rise is no longer validated by its need to recover from its historical obstacles, but by its need to continue to develop and grow in the present.
I am not so confident saying the same of Korea's nationalism. This course has suggested to me that ROK remains very much held hostage by its troubled past. Certainly, division provides a demoralizing reminder of this difficult history, but nonetheless, Korea's nationalism, I believe, remains very much rooted in the past. This perhaps makes them less willing than the Chinese to engage Japan now that their neighbour has reached out.
I'm curious to hear what people think.
Sunday, April 08, 2007
HR 121 Petition
A friend of mine is involved in a campaign to bring HR 121, the proposed resolution involving comfort women during WWII, to a vote in front of the entire House. Her father is the chairperson of the Washington Coalition of Support for HR 121, and this is their website if you would like more information. More specifically, they are asking people to write a letter to their Congressman to support the resoultion, and there is a standard formate available on the site. So if you feel compelled, I'm sure they would appreciate your support.
Saturday, April 07, 2007
Bad Terms both with North and South Koreas
North Korea did not like the Japanese government's revision of history textbooks, either.
NKorea blasts Japan for distorting history in wake of textbook revisions IHT, April 3
The Ministeral talks between South Korea and Japan also confirmed that there is a big rift between the two. (4th LD) S. Korea, Japan hold ministerial talks amid tension over history row Yonhap, March 31, and Long Way to Go: Foreign Ministers Reconfirm Seoul-Tokyo Distance Korea Times, April 2
And there seems to be an increasing domestic pressure on Korean politicians to take more hawkish stance towards Japan on this issue. Politicians criticized for lukewarm attitude toward Japan's history distortion, Yonhap, April 5. This article interestingly highlights the shift of focus among Korean politicians who used to fan anti-Japanese sentiment but now neglect the issue.
"In the past, South Korean politicians took the initiative in fanning anti-Japanese sentiment: They visited the Japanese Embassy in protest, adopted a resolution condemning Tokyo’s controversial moves and released a list of names of hundreds of Koreans who collaborated with colonial Japan..."I admit that we've been neglecting the issue," said an aid to Rep. Jeon Yeo-ok, a conservative voice in the GNP who is the author of the book “There is no Japan." The presidential election is the priority."
NKorea blasts Japan for distorting history in wake of textbook revisions IHT, April 3
The Ministeral talks between South Korea and Japan also confirmed that there is a big rift between the two. (4th LD) S. Korea, Japan hold ministerial talks amid tension over history row Yonhap, March 31, and Long Way to Go: Foreign Ministers Reconfirm Seoul-Tokyo Distance Korea Times, April 2
And there seems to be an increasing domestic pressure on Korean politicians to take more hawkish stance towards Japan on this issue. Politicians criticized for lukewarm attitude toward Japan's history distortion, Yonhap, April 5. This article interestingly highlights the shift of focus among Korean politicians who used to fan anti-Japanese sentiment but now neglect the issue.
"In the past, South Korean politicians took the initiative in fanning anti-Japanese sentiment: They visited the Japanese Embassy in protest, adopted a resolution condemning Tokyo’s controversial moves and released a list of names of hundreds of Koreans who collaborated with colonial Japan..."I admit that we've been neglecting the issue," said an aid to Rep. Jeon Yeo-ok, a conservative voice in the GNP who is the author of the book “There is no Japan." The presidential election is the priority."
The Futility of the 6PT
As I am often prone to do in my nerdiness, Thursday morning I found myself watching CSPAN. The fact that I actually punched in the numbers on the remote rather than just stumbled across it on a channel-surfing spree reveals a little more than I would like, but that's beside the point. What got my attention once I got to channel 81 was the handsome moustache and "I'm right, you're an idiot" tone of everyone's favorite former ambassador to the UN, John Bolton. What kept my attention was the topic of the panel he was participating in, "A Fair Deal for North Korea?." (There is audio and video of the event on the right side of the page; the video seemed to have issues but the audio worked very well)
AEI hosted this panel featuring Amb. Bolton, along with Nick Eberstadt and Dan Bloumenthal, to discuss (and for the most part disparage) the merits, or lack there of, of negotiating with North Korea. This issue will probably come up in class in a few weeks when we focus on North Korea, but I think that a preview never hurt anyone.
Amb. Bolton shaped the fundamental question at the heart of the debate. "Do you believe that North Korea will ever voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program?" If yes, then party on, Wayne, but if not, then the process is futile and potentially dangerous, as it allows Pyongyang to emerge from the corner that it has been backed into, and risks direct use of the weapons or transfer of the weapons to a terrorist group or criminal organization.
Bolton and Eberstadt both discuss how historically North Korea has consistently proven itself to be unreliable in negotiation, and to be committed to and politically dependent on a nuclear program for its survival (There is a great piece by Victor Cha in NBR's Strategic Asia 2004-2005; I've linked it here if you have the time to read it; Cha dubs Pyongyang's strategy as one of "receive (aid) and retain (nukes)" ). These factors, and the fact that the North is likely to miss the 60 day deadline this week, suggest that negotiations are a misguided strategy and do not serve U.S. interests. Bolton also notes that Yongbyon is potentially on its last legs, making it not all that considerable of a concession on Pyongyang's part. Finally, Bloumenthal adds some interesting points about how this negotiation process has hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance, what he believes should be Washington's strategic priority in East Asia, and also minimizes the importance of North Korean denuclearization. These elements further compromise American strategic interests in the region.
The issues raised in this panel bring up a lot of important questions, most notably the central question framed by Amb. Bolton. If you accept that North Korea sticks to a policy of "receive and retain," does the Kim regime really have any benefit to gain from long term cooperation with the int'l community and total denuclearization? If not, why would it voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program? On another note, is Pyongyang's nuclear test really that big of a deal? Was it the result of a "failure of U.S. policy"?
I personally find it hard to believe that the North would ever directly use a nuclear weapon against another state as the result would likely be the complete decimation of the country and the toppling of the Kim regime. I also find it hard to believe that weapons would be trafficked out of North Korea. For one thing, if I'm not mistaken, the North only has a handful of warheads (5 or 6?)and it needs all the help it can get from where I'm sitting. For another, this isn't the frontier regions of Pakistan we're talking about here. East Asia and the countries in it strike me as generally secure and well-policed areas. I'm skeptical that a nuclear weapon could be successfully smuggled out of the country, especially under conditions of enhanced scrutiny in the post-test world. At the same time, East Asia is notorious for human trafficking and drug trafficking problems, and the transfer of technology or nuclear know-how is not as far-fetched.
That being said, I firmly believe negotiations are necessary. It's all well and good to continue to push Pyongyang into a corner, but eventually you reach an equilibrium and can squeeze no more. I don't think that the top dogs in the North would be threatened by such a strategy. The humanitarian and social side-effects would be horrific, and the strategic pay-off would ultimately be nil.
Negotiations begin a process that goes far beyond simple denuclearization and eventually addresses the root causes of the issue, opening the door for peace and reconciliation on the Peninsula and in the region. This round of negotiations differs from previous experiences in that China has taken a much more active role since Pyongyang's nuclear test. This presence at the table and influence on Pyongyang could prove to be a deciding factor in the outcome of the 6PT.
In addition, the hold-up with the negotiations now does not strike me as North Korea being nit-picky or giving everyone the run-around. The other players have yet to live up to their end of the bargain, so why should the North?
I think I've written enough for one post. Congrats if you had the attention span to get all the way through.
AEI hosted this panel featuring Amb. Bolton, along with Nick Eberstadt and Dan Bloumenthal, to discuss (and for the most part disparage) the merits, or lack there of, of negotiating with North Korea. This issue will probably come up in class in a few weeks when we focus on North Korea, but I think that a preview never hurt anyone.
Amb. Bolton shaped the fundamental question at the heart of the debate. "Do you believe that North Korea will ever voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program?" If yes, then party on, Wayne, but if not, then the process is futile and potentially dangerous, as it allows Pyongyang to emerge from the corner that it has been backed into, and risks direct use of the weapons or transfer of the weapons to a terrorist group or criminal organization.
Bolton and Eberstadt both discuss how historically North Korea has consistently proven itself to be unreliable in negotiation, and to be committed to and politically dependent on a nuclear program for its survival (There is a great piece by Victor Cha in NBR's Strategic Asia 2004-2005; I've linked it here if you have the time to read it; Cha dubs Pyongyang's strategy as one of "receive (aid) and retain (nukes)" ). These factors, and the fact that the North is likely to miss the 60 day deadline this week, suggest that negotiations are a misguided strategy and do not serve U.S. interests. Bolton also notes that Yongbyon is potentially on its last legs, making it not all that considerable of a concession on Pyongyang's part. Finally, Bloumenthal adds some interesting points about how this negotiation process has hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance, what he believes should be Washington's strategic priority in East Asia, and also minimizes the importance of North Korean denuclearization. These elements further compromise American strategic interests in the region.
The issues raised in this panel bring up a lot of important questions, most notably the central question framed by Amb. Bolton. If you accept that North Korea sticks to a policy of "receive and retain," does the Kim regime really have any benefit to gain from long term cooperation with the int'l community and total denuclearization? If not, why would it voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program? On another note, is Pyongyang's nuclear test really that big of a deal? Was it the result of a "failure of U.S. policy"?
I personally find it hard to believe that the North would ever directly use a nuclear weapon against another state as the result would likely be the complete decimation of the country and the toppling of the Kim regime. I also find it hard to believe that weapons would be trafficked out of North Korea. For one thing, if I'm not mistaken, the North only has a handful of warheads (5 or 6?)and it needs all the help it can get from where I'm sitting. For another, this isn't the frontier regions of Pakistan we're talking about here. East Asia and the countries in it strike me as generally secure and well-policed areas. I'm skeptical that a nuclear weapon could be successfully smuggled out of the country, especially under conditions of enhanced scrutiny in the post-test world. At the same time, East Asia is notorious for human trafficking and drug trafficking problems, and the transfer of technology or nuclear know-how is not as far-fetched.
That being said, I firmly believe negotiations are necessary. It's all well and good to continue to push Pyongyang into a corner, but eventually you reach an equilibrium and can squeeze no more. I don't think that the top dogs in the North would be threatened by such a strategy. The humanitarian and social side-effects would be horrific, and the strategic pay-off would ultimately be nil.
Negotiations begin a process that goes far beyond simple denuclearization and eventually addresses the root causes of the issue, opening the door for peace and reconciliation on the Peninsula and in the region. This round of negotiations differs from previous experiences in that China has taken a much more active role since Pyongyang's nuclear test. This presence at the table and influence on Pyongyang could prove to be a deciding factor in the outcome of the 6PT.
In addition, the hold-up with the negotiations now does not strike me as North Korea being nit-picky or giving everyone the run-around. The other players have yet to live up to their end of the bargain, so why should the North?
I think I've written enough for one post. Congrats if you had the attention span to get all the way through.
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