Thursday, April 19, 2007
Diary from the Other Side
Prof. Larsen will be glad to know that when the performers formed a giant human map of Korea, they did include Dokdo.
The movements of the journalists (two Brits, it seems) were severely restricted, as was their ability to take photographs, film, and dictate where they were going. The isolation seems to be taking a toll as their minders did not speak English (but one spoke Chinese!). However, the tour guides did.
Another interesting tidbit: you can major in Juche at college! And the monument has one block for every day up to the Eternal Leader's 75th birthday. Why 75? My guess: that's how many blocks there were. Also, Kim Jong-il is considered the mother of the nation, and his father the, well, father.
Aside from general strangeness, this tour is another glimpse of the controls placed on foreign visitors, and interesting because they were, in this case, British, rather than American. They do not seem to have visited the USS Pueblo. The North Korean officials seem determined to both impress their guests and strictly control what they see, which is certainly not a surprise. There is a profound effort to communicate North Korean beliefs and ideology to the West, as long as the West makes no attempt to communicate back. Is there something to be said for the North Koreans wanting understanding of their philosophies and goals?
Pueblo-mania!
Anyway, because there are a bunch of good, concise websites that cover the topic, I'm not going to clog up our blog by repeating what they say (especially since we've had guidance not to do so, which makes sense.) I'll give a rundown of a couple of sites, toss in some pics, include some factoids, and then command you to get back to whatever productive endeavor it is you're supposed to actually be doing right now! Don't know about you all, but I love these type of mini-intrigue stories that occur within the context of larger conflicts.
1) To get started, here is a brief bio about the ship (stats) on, of course, Wikipedia. Not particularly well done, if you ask me, but it does have a section on the bottom about the DPRK offering (IMO seems like blackmail) to repatriate the ship in exchange for high level meetings with the US.
2) If you read no other website on this list, check this one out. Obviously, I can't speak to the accuracy of any of the information, but it gives a very detailed rundown of what actually happened, along with some pics and an explanation of why the President decided not to try to rescue the ship and its crew at the time. Here's one of the crew, 82 men who were held for 11 months, giving the North Koreans the "Hawaiian Good Luck Sign," as we mentioned in class, for which they endured a week of brutal torture, called "Hell Week." This is in addition to the beatings they were given (with lumber), the burns inflicted upon them (with radiators), and the teeth they had kicked in (see the CNN piece below).3) This site has a few good pics, three of which I'll post here. One is of the Pueblo docked in Pyongyang. The second is of the tour guide who gives tours of the ship. The third is of the captain of the North Korean ship that captured her. Glad she's using a megaphone, seeing as the crowd is all of 2 feet away.
Since it's too large, I won't post the fourth here, but head over and check it out...or fire up Google Earth. There's a wicked cool aerial shot of the Pueblo sitting in Pyongyang now. OK, enough about Google Earth...seeing as they're most likely watching me type this, I don't want to anger them and get incinerated by their laser beams of wrath.


4) Here's an MSNBC item describing Bill Richardson's visit to the Pueblo, which is used for "anti-American education." Coincidentally, Richardson is running for President. He had some success repatriating the remains of several US servicmen killed in the war, which I'm sure will be an incredibly powerful gift to their families. The item gives a brief description of his tour of the Pueblo.
5) Finally, a CNN piece detailing the passing of the Pueblo's captain, Captain Bucher (pictured here), in January of 2004. Apparently, his actions helped the crew survive the experience. To show their gratitude, the Navy recommended that he be court-martialed for failing to defend the Pueblo sufficiently, which was a slow, poorly armed ship and was also covered in ice. (Not to mention that he requested help from US forces nearby...help that never came). Thankfully, former US Marine, US Senator, and Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee (who served in that capacity from 1969-1972) turned down the court-martial.Lastly, and I'll stop wasting electrons after this, to answer Professor Larsen's question about why the US didn't attempt to recover the Pueblo when the DPRK sailed (towed) it to its present location. I haven't found anything conclusive. The Wikipedia article above notes that "In October 1999, it was towed from Wonson on the east coast, around the Korean Peninsula, to Nampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters. No attempt to recapture the Pueblo was made." I've saw articles that suggest that the US "intelligence community" completely missed the event. However, I haven't found anything authoritative yet. I'll poke around more and see what I can come up with. Wow did this become a long post!
Cho Family's American Dream Broken in Pieces
Part of the article reads:
"Many young Koreans who move to the U.S. with their parents seeking the American dream suffer culture shock from exposure to the strange environment where they cannot even understand the language.
They also have confusion about identity _ neither being Korean nor American.
Despite their difficulty, most of them may not always receive enough care from their parents, who have to focus on working all day to survive in the new country."
I am not here to make excuse for Cho, but there is a problem at universities -- some students don't get enough attention, especially international students. A few months ago I wrote an article published in the Washington Post, and one of my interviewees told me: "At school, nobody cares about you." There are more problems behind this VT tragedy, not just Cho's distorted and disturbing personality.
I was very disappointed by Nikki Giovanni, the distinguished poet. Cho was in her class in 2005, and Giovanni told the department that she would resign if Cho was not removed from her class. Last night, Giovanni was on Larry King Live. She told Larry King that once she talked to Cho face to face, "Cho, either of us has to leave this classroom." She also said, she felt evil in Cho and she didn't want to see him.
During the VT Convocation after the tragedy, Giovanni spoke so eloquently and so humanitarianly
"We know we did nothing to deserve it, but neither does a child in Africa dying of AIDS, neither do the invisible children walking the night away to avoid being captured by the rogue army, neither does the baby elephant watching his community being devastated for ivory, neither does the Mexican child looking for fresh water..."
I was just wondering, if Giovanni had given a little more attention, care and love to Cho, would the thing have been different? That makes me think: some people can talk, but they can not do...
Sorry for the long entry
Stickin' it to the Man: BDA Fights Back!
The IHT reports that BDA is challenging the US Treasury Department's decision to bar it from access to the US financial system because it feels the decision was politically motivated, lacked sufficient evidence, ignored remedial measures the bank had taken, and denied BDA the opportunity to respond to some of the allegations made in due course. They have thus decided to employ the most nefarious of all tools, the New York Lawyer, to redress the situation! Oh, the humanity of it all. How dare they play by our rules and use our own laws against us!
Other interesting factoids from the piece:
- The bank is family owned. A gentleman named Stanley Au, a Macao business type, apparently owns it. The IHT story describes him as "an adviser to the Chinese government." Hmmm...yeah...adviser.
- The ruling was apparently made under the Patriot Act. (I'm biting my tongue here). Maybe it's my faulty memory, but I don't remember seeing this tidbit mentioned in the reports that covered the development at the time. Wonder what that says (if I'm right).
- The case has apparently engendered a modicum of legal reform in China, as the Macao banking authorities have passed new laws against money laundering as a direct result of the incident.
Understandably so, given the impact this must be having on their business, BDA seems quite concerned. Upon accessing their website, http://www.delta-asia.com, the following "Important Statement," more than a month old, appears in a large popup window:
March 16, 2007
Important Statement
By Group Chairman, Delta Asia Group (Holdings) Ltd In Response To US Department Of Treasury's Announcement Dated March 14, 2007
Delta Asia Group (Holdings) Limited (“DAGH”) regrets the US Department of Treasury’s decision to finalise the rulemaking to impose a special measure against our commercial banking arm, Banco Delta Asia, S.A.R.L. (“BDA”).
DAGH denies that BDA knew or suspected that its customers were engaged in money laundering or that any of its customers were engaged in any criminal activities or their funds were in any way connected with such activities. It is always BDA’s commitment to ensuring that its anti-money laundering policies and procedures comply with the guidelines and requirements of the regulator, that is, the Macau Monetary Authority.
Since the designation of BDA by the US Department of Treasury in September 2005, BDA has always been co-operating fully with the US regulator and remains committed to enhancing its anti-money laundering (“AML”) and know-your-client policies and procedures. To demonstrate substantial improved performance in this regard, BDA has made significant efforts at tremendous cost to:
1. review accounts and close the concerned accounts;2. further enhance its AML policies and revise its AML manual;
3. commission international and independent professional accounting firm to identify weaknesses and implement effective programme to improve the AML programme;
4. hire compliance officer
5. improve and upgrade information technology system
DAGH expects BDA to continue to appeal against this rulemaking and to seek further dialogue and co-operation with the US Department of Treasury.
I'm not familiar with international banking practices, but I'd be interested to know how long these types of restrictions usually last and how often such appeals are successful. I wonder if the case will be expedited because it's so high profile. Otherwise, this could take a while, as the case might, as I like to say, "move with the speed of government."
Still no word on the North getting its money or movement to shut down the reactor. And so it goes...
Wednesday, April 18, 2007
And the Nobel Peace Prize goes to...Vladimir Putin?
A former Korean NIS official, now professor, reveals this interesting information in a recent Chosun Ilbo article.
In an effort to not let the more entertaining news of the story overshadow the relevant, Seoul has apparently reached out to Pyongyang through a secret report, in an effort to let tensions between the two be resolved bilaterally, without foreign interference. Seoul appears to find this a more productive alternative, not surprising considering the history of outside influence on the peninsula's development.
The third country element of the story, where Russia comes in, reflects 1) the need for both sides to be on neutral territory, and 2) that Pyongyang has apparently failed in the reciprocity department, as Kim Jong-Il has yet to return the gesture of Kim Dae-jung's 2000 visit. (See today's Asia Times article Korea: the Sun Shines Regardless)
This would certainly be an interesting development should it occur (which I'm highly skeptical it will). It would certainly make Russia more relevant in the grander 6PT scheme. Moscow's motivation doesn't appear to be all that sincere however.
Putin winning a Nobel Peace Prize?!?!?! I mean, come on. What's next? Three-6 Mafia winning an Oscar? ... ... ... ... oh.
Major development in the "comfort women" saga
At the conclusion of World War II, the French, Dutch and Chinese governments produced and submitted seven documents to the Tokyo Trial, disclosing evidence of Japanese-run brothels in Indonesia, China, East Timor and Vietnam. These documents were included by the tribunal in the body of evidence used to convict suspected war criminals. The troubling contents of these documents reveal these women were forced to work as sex-slaves for the Japanese forces.
Apparently, by accepting the peace treaty at the end of the war, which included recognition of the validity of these war trials under Article 11, the Japanese government acknowledged coercing young women into sexual servitude.
This newly revealed evidence certainly leaves Abe and some conservatives in the Japanese government a little bit red-faced. Perhaps, however, like most pieces of historical evidence, the validity of these claims are up for dispute, regardless of whether they were admitted as evidence during the Tokyo Trials.
Tuesday, April 17, 2007
Virginia Tech
I do wonder, though, if this will have any effect on how Koreans view foreigners in Korea. Much of the anti-American sentiments are riled up due to deplorable acts or even accidents on the part of U.S. soliders in Korea. Obviously, the fact that there are U.S. soldiers there at all is what drives much of the resentment. But I think it is greatly fueled by incidents of soldiers misbehaving and/or committing crimes.
The Foreign Ministry has asked that this incident doesn't stir up racial prejudice against Koreans or Korea. It should go without saying that the shooter's nationality had nothing to do with his actions. But I wonder if Korea would withhold racist judgments if a foreigner were to do somthing like this in Korea. I'm hoping that, if nothing else, this terrible incident will cause some Koreans to reconsider applying xenophobic generalizations to individual acts.
Monday, April 16, 2007
SK may hold food aid to North after missed deadline
The two Koreas are slated to begin economic discussions on Wednesday, at which point the issue of rice aid was to be discussed. Previously, South Korean officials had stated that the aid would proceed regardless of whether or not the Yongbyon reactor had been shut down and sealed by the deadline. Pyongyang had asked the South for 400,000 tonnes of rice aid.
Now however, it appears that Seoul has taken a new stance as the 6PT deadline has come and gone. South Korean officials met Sunday to discuss the next steps. One official told a Korean paper, "We can't just ignore and do nothing if... North Korea doesn't take initial steps [to meet February's agreement]." (That reminds of the "Super Kim" video below. I found it with subtitles and it turns out his "Special Move" is to "ignore and continue.") I find this stance somewhat encouraging and a little bit surprising. It's nice to see the usually accommodating South Korea put a little more muscle into the disarmament/peace process.
The article also mentions the Japanese reaction - very hard-line - and references the "China wants us to wait" line that Larry first brought up. In retrospect, it is entirely possible that there is more to this than just U.S. domestic posturing. China might have something up its sleeve to sway Pyongyang (or China's banks). Maybe the 6PT is more of a multilateral effort than I gave it credit for in my previous post.
Sunday, April 15, 2007
Is this the guy?
I came across the Songun blog while browsing YouTube for KJI videos. Kim Jong Il, The Great Economist ... yeah, sure.
Super Kim....
How many Parties does it take to screw in a light bulb?
Larry, I agree that the language of Hill's statement seems a bit odd. But I also think you're right when you call attention to the source of the story and the audience it is written for. I think the major deciding factor in this case is indeed 1) the media source and 2) the domestic audience (political and mass). I believe the 6 Party talks are very much a combined effort by all parties involved and not really a case of the U.S. forcing everyone to cooperate. (Dan Bloumenthal would suggest that Japan is none to pleased about the arrangment b/c it compromises Tokyo's efforts to resolve the abduction issue, etc.) Keep in mind, it was Beijing's efforts to get everyone back to the table, not Washington's that got this thing back in motion.
I think Hill's recent statements aim primarily at conservative critics in the U.S. Using assertive, "the ball's in your court" language, it reflects that (for better or worse) the administration's concessions have a limit, and the North will have to be active in order for talks to progress. The China line, which no other participants' media coverage makes mention of, I would suggest is simply used as another reason for letting the deadline pass. "Hey, if arguably the most powerful country in the region wants us to be patient, then I think we should oblige." That kind of thing.
Here are a handful of articles of coverage of recent developments in the Talks from Korean and Chinese media. Japan didn't have much to say on the subject this weekend.
Korean media
Xinhua
"China urges actions to promote progress of six-party talks"
The "China wanted patience" line does not appear in any of the articles. The last article however does publicize the Chinese representative's statement urging everyone to do the right thing and honor the spirit of the talks to this point (ie. keep calm and withdraw your damn funds already).
The question of whether this is more of a bilateral or multilateral undertaking at the core is most interesting. Despite my earlier statement, the more I think about, the more I begin to question just how multilateral the 6PT is. Without the U.S., I question whether the other parties involved would have the patience and will to sit at the same table with one another. Historical tensions b/w Japan and the Koreas would make things challenging to say the least without the U.S. mediating force. China would probably prefer to leave Japan out of the equation and handle the issue more as a border security issue than a broader international nuclear proliferation issue. South Korea's sunshine policy seems to have no limits, even after last fall's nuclear test. And Russia...well, I'm not sure why they're there actually, beyond wanting to be included for status's sake.
From where I stand, it seems the U.S. is indeed the glue behind this operation, as well as the driving force. It's entirely possible that the Chinese example I heralded earlier was in fact a back room maneuver on Washington's part to hype up the "international initiative" to resolve the issue for the domestic audience.
After the test, Bush kept saying how he thought this should be handled multilaterally. The other guys didn't seem to be getting much done until the U.S. got back to the table, but Washington outright leading the charge would've been equivalent to admitting a failed policy (of isolation and sanctions, etc.). Thus, maybe Washington went through the back door in Beijing to get the ball rolling again.
There are definitely a number of issues with these talks and certainly a lot of dancing back and forth with little progress. I'm going to take a more optimistic approach than Larry though. I think that there is common interest in moving things forward, and despite some potholes in the road and the prospect of a really, REALLY long trip, this is really the only road to travel.
Saturday, April 14, 2007
"The Chinese wanted us to show some patience"
I find Hill's statement interesting. Is this an indication of the sway China holds in this process? If China wants the five non-DPRK parties to display some patience, why not make the announcement itself? Is this good, old fashioned diplomatic (or US domestic political) posturing? Is it a tacit expression of the view that the issue is, in actuality, a US-DPRK bilateral issue? Could the US-centric focus simply be a reflection of that fact that I pulled the piece from CNN? I guess, belaboring the obvious, my question is: why is it "the US" that has decided to give North Korea a few more days and not "we the five parties of the Six Party Talks have decided"? I wonder if there will be an official statement with wording that presents the decision as that of the five parties, not just the United States.
Anyway, an unidentified official from the State Department referenced in the article notes that the US deems it "prudent" to give the North a measure of additional time, but cautions that the Administration's patience has limits.
Hill is also quoted as saying that DPRK officials are aware that their funds have been made accessible and, at the end of the piece, remarks that there has been an asymmetry of diplomatic effort to move things forward (quipping that the DPRK hasn't put forth an effort commensurate with that of the other parties).
As Will observed in class, the ball is now squarely in Pyongyang's court. In the next few weeks, with the BDA issue apparently resolved, we should see if the North is prepared to move forward with the denuclearization process. Sure, I'm a pessimist, but why do I see a "one step forward, one step back" dance routine in our future?
Here's to hoping I'm wrong on the eve of what would be the Eternal Leader's 95th birthday.

Feeling Lucky
Good Luck for South Korea, Bad Luck for Japan
The article says that first of all Koreans should thank Mao Zedong for slowing the economic development by launching the Cultural Revolution in China. And then it continues that South Korea is lucky with the FTA deal:
"Regrettably, Japan has no opportunity to reach an FTA with the U.S. for a considerable period, because the five-year Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that the U.S. Congress has given the Bush administration has almost expired. Japan will have to wait until the next TPA resumes. It's bad luck for Japan, which has lost its chance, but good luck for Korea, which has gotten a head start."
Wen Jiabao's interview given to ROC press
From Wen's answers, you really can see, China regards the trade as the most important. Because of that, the Chinese government suppresses many sensitive issues in the media, such as the "Koguryo" dispute. The public generally won't read academic articles for historical truth, and they are used to consuming "fast food." So many Korean Chinese got one-sided views by reading the Korean newspapers regarding the history of Koguryo. As a result, the Chinese government may have kept the China-ROK trade going, but lost the hearts of some Chinese Koreans.
Coming Sigur Center talks
Thursday, April 26 (more information avaialbe: here)
Opening Speech (9:45 am - 10:15 am): Won-Soon Park, Attorney and Executive Secretary, Hope Institute, "Korean Civic Movement"
Session I (10:15 am - 12:15 pm): Peace and Korean NGOs
- Wooksik Cheong, Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea and George Washington University, "Two Koreas and the United States: Another Future is Possible"
- Bo Geun Kim, Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture and Columbia University), "A Survey: Knowledge of North Korea Among NGOs in the United States and South Korea"
- Jaehun Choi, Imagination for International Solidarity and British Columbia University, Canada, "Unleashed Overseas Dispatch of South Korean Troops: Why Should We Go There?"
- Discussant: John Feffer, Co-Director, Foreign Policy in Focus and Director of Global Affairs, International Relations Center
Keynote Speech (1:15 pm - 1:45 pm): Don Oberdorfer, Chairman, The U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, "New Triangle: Two Koreas and the U.S. in the 21st Century: Prospects and the NGO's Role"
Session II (1:45 pm -3:15 pm): Human Rights and Korean NGOs
- Seung Chang Ha, Citizens' Action Network and Columbia University, "Immigration Problems as the Upcoming Agenda in Korea"
- Mi Sun Kim, Migrant Workers Health Association in Korea and Stanford University, "Advocacy Networks for (Im)migrant's Rights in the U.S. (Bay Area) and Korea - Strategies, Gains, and Challenges for the Networks"
- Sooji Lee, Research Institute of the Differently Abled Person's Rights in Korea and British Columbia University, Canada, "The Rights of Differently Abled Persons in the U.S."
- Yuseok Chung, Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center and Indiana University, "The Anti-Sexual Violence Movement in Korea : Achievements and Limits of the Feminist Law Reform Movement"
Session III (3:30 pm - 5:00 pm): Civic Participation and Korean NGOs
Session III (3:30 pm - 5:00 pm): Civic Participation and Korean NGOs
- Il Pyo Hong, Institute for Participatory Society and George Washington University, "How U.S. Think Tanks Influence Policy-making: Comparing Progressive and Conservative Think Tanks"
- So Yeun Kim, Citizens' Movement for Environmental Justice and Indiana University, "Problems of Conflict Resolution and the NGO’s Role for Civic Participation in South Korea"
- Doo Hyon Choi, Korea Federation for Environments, Jeonju and Stanford University, "Social Capital in the U.S. as Compared to South Korea"
--------------
Visiting Scholar Roundtable: "Between the Collapse of Japanese Empire and Normalization with East Asian States: Repatriations, Reparations, and Memories Reconsidered"
Speaker: Toyomi Asano, Professor of Chukyo University.
Thursday, May 3, 3:00-4:15pm
INTERESTING NOGUN-RI DEVELOPMENT
KN misses deadline
It is unclear exactly where the hold up is, except to say that the North is holding to its line that it will make progress when the funds issued resolution becomes a reality, and the US continues to say that North Korea is free to takes its money now.
In an uncharacteristic show of common front with the rest of the Six Parties, South Korea has refused to ship the 50,000 tons of HFO. Although, in my cynical mind I see some poor South Korean tanker captain waiting with his ship out in the Sea of Japan just south of the NLL, unable to return to port in the event that the North does make the slightest step of progress, so that the ROK government can deliver the fuel instantaneously.
Ah well. Maybe we'll see some action after the celebrations over the next two weeks (KIS birthday and KWP anniversary). From open source images of the parade practices, it looks to be quite a show!
Friday, April 13, 2007
ROC POWs in the Korean War
I have lots of documents about this organization because.... I once worked for them in Taiwan (but believe me, I have a very different ideology from them)!!
Korean Central News Agency
While it is probably inadvisable to rely on it as a credible news source, I believe that it does provide a small window into the thinking of the regime in Pyongyang. On the one hand, it illustrates some of the propoganda tactics used on the North Korean people. For instance, roughly every third article discusses how some figure in the international community recently praised the wonderous accomplishments of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. The theme of the outside world looking in (NOT due to security concerns) is also prevalent.
On the other hand, I think the occasional article also speaks to the attitudes of the leadership as well. For example, before the 6 Party Talks resumed earlier this year, I recall reading a number of news feeds condemning U.S. imperialism and hypocrisy, etc. Now however, a recent story discusses "achieving peace and implementing the socio-economic tasks" on the Korean peninsula. While a small indicator, I don't think it is completley negligible.
Anyway, I just wanted to share this with anyone who hasn't seen it before. I think it mostly interesting (and moderately amusing) to read through the propoganda pieces. Then again, I guess I can't refute that Cambodia and India recently celebrated the Day of the Sun. Whether or not the language accurately reflects sentiment in the regime however, is up for debate.
Thursday, April 12, 2007
US-Korea Relations and the Documentary Evidence
Kennedy Administration
Johnson Administration, including a section about Korea-Japan relations also Japan and China for those interested.
Those are the only ones that, on their face, deal with Korea. (For the China people, there's this one on the opening to China.) Others discuss general economic policy, trade policies, and other things, throughout the different administrations. A complete index of the available FRUS volumes is here.
Social Movements and Legislation in South Korea
He discussed the movements for democracy, emphasizing the broad-based demand for democracy, expressed through a number of organizations that often utilized extreme tactics (he showed a picture of a man self-immolating and, I think, falling off a roof, and another of Lee Han-yeol, mentioned here as a martyr for the democracy cause). Another aspect of interest for our class is that most Korean social movements are national in scope and focus. They do not attempt to modify local policies, seem not to be motivated by local politics (as they often are in the US) but rather by national issues. They have focused on different issues over time, starting with labor and gender issues, and moving, today, to what Dr. Hong called "political" issues, such as matters of institutional reform, corruption, the "purity" of candidates, party reform, and other governance topics.
While Dr. Hong was a very determined supporter of the social movements, he did point out one flaw, that they seriously and consistently weakened the party structure. He pointed to the "black list movement" of judging politicians and attempting to prevent those deemed improper candidates from being elected, as a cause of a siginifcant recent increase in the number of bills put forth by legislators, a change from a large number previously put forth by social movements and citizens movements. To me, this perhaps signifies that peopel are beginning to trust legislators and politicians more, and are allowing them to do their job as legislators, but I do not know enough about the topic to say for certain. Dr. Hong also stated that all of this activity has not only brought forth the progressive groups, but also solidified the conservatives into a functional coalition.
My major questions, in terms of the function of South Korean democracy (however effective you believe it is) is something that I know is driven by my American understanding: that bills and other legislation is originated directly from the people through petition, which is then brought up for discussion just like any other bill. That was my understanding from the talk today, and if I am misunderstanding, I would appreciate any explanation. Given this understanding, to me, this seems odd, Dr. Hong pointed out that this sidelines politicians, emphasizes the media, and national issues. Is it possible that this style of democracy is part of what is driving the centrality of nationalist and historical issues in South Korean politics?
I have many more notes from this talk, so if anyone has any questions or comments, please ask!
more resources on the Korean War
I was especially interested in Shen Zhihua's article (the second piece), which describes the Sino-North Korean conflict during the War. He talks about that the Chinese leadership did not recieve notification of the attack on South Korea on June 25, and they learned of it from foreign news services; China intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began, but the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so because of the UN advance across the 38th parallel.
Opposite to my thinking.
H.R. 121, Rep. Honda & California's 15th District
In general, the 15th district is quite diverse: 29.4% is of Asian heritage (54.7% is white), 33.8% of the population is foreign born, 43.2% speak a language other than English in their home. Geographically, it encompasses much of Silicon Valley. Although Koreans are included in district's demographic description, no Korean or Korean-American organization was included in the list of local organizations.
In terms of his legislative record, he’s quite liberal and is especially known for his commitment to civil rights. Rep. Honda also received a fair amount of attention for his support for Muslim Americans, particularly after September 11.
Specifically pertaining to the comfort women issue, his motivation for sponsoring this legislation seems to be out of a personal commitment to historical reconciliation. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Honda sponsored a measure in the California State Assembly in 1999 which called on Congress to urge the Japanese government to issue an apology for the vicitims of Nanking, comfort women and POWs used as slave laborers. Moreover, his interest takes a more personal note. In his Feb. 15th testimony before the House Foreign Affair Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment on HR 121, he references his expereince as a Japanese-American infant interned during World War II and the power of reconciliation through government actions.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
New Prime Minister in North Korea
This article from Asia Times indicates that Pak was considered by outside watchers to be something of a reformer, though in a limited way allowed to him in Pyongyang. However, this article was from about two years ago. I have not managed an exhaustive search, but very little has been written about him which is unsurprising given the secretiveness of his government.
As far as I could tell, nothing is written about his replacement, Kim Yong Il.
Anyone who knows more about how the North Korean government works and wants to speculate on why Pak was removed? Has becoming prime minister, an automatically risky position, simply finally caught up with him? Or is it related to the Six Party Talks? Or simply to continuing economic difficulties? Could he possibly be a threat in the power structure? It will be interesting to see if North Korea gives any indication as to why, and what analysts say about it.
30-day extension? It's too long!
As the US government had removed the final roadblock by agreeing for $25 million in Banco Delta Asia to be released to its depositors, principally the North Korean government, hopefully we can see the North Korea return American "good faith" by shutting down Yongbyon soon.
Kim Jong Il's Fashion Makeover
But you guys check it out and tell me what you think...
6PT update?
This article from JoongAng Daily reveals that the U.S. has essentially washed its hands of the frozen funds issue. I'm a bit confused in that I'm not sure this is anything new. At the same time, the article mentions that the "Macao authorities are prepared to unblock all North Korean-related accounts currently frozen in Banco Delta Asia." This language suggests that all funds, not just the "legitimate" ones are now free. If that's the case, that seems like quite a major concession. Later in the article however, it again refers to the $25 million total.
If the $25 million total is still the sum the parties are working with then this is probably just a diplomatic gesture to tell Pyongyang that it must take the initiative and bear responsibility for the progress of the talks. If more funds are now free (which I don't think to be the case, despite some sloppy reporting) that strikes me as being a little too generous. Presuming the former, it will be interesting to see if North Korea will take the necessary steps or go the way that Bolton and co. are predicting.
On different note, if you haven't seen it, I strongly recommend giving the March 31 edition of the Economist a look through. It features roughly 10 articles as part of a survey of China's relations with its Asian neighbors, including one piece entitled "History Wars." It's about the Koguryo controversy. I was pretty impressed by both the article and the survey as a whole, and strongly encourage any China-philes to check it out. I would link it, but it's a subscription-only article, so unless you have a subscription you won't be able to see it. I could e-mail the article to you however if you so desire. Let me know at wbuck@gwu.edu .
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in South Korea
It seems the talks are centered on the issues of denuclearization in North Korea and of trade between China and South Korea. But I hope the leaders of the two countries would have some talks on more cultural cooperation. Such as more Korean scholars being allowed to research on the Koguryo tombs.
The Korean War
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On June 25, 1950, a powerful invading force from the Soviet-supported Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) swept south of the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Within days, President Truman resolved to defend South Korea, even though there were few Americans in Korea and few troops ready for combat. The UN Security Council, acting during a Soviet boycott, quickly passed a resolution calling upon UN members to resist North Korean aggression.
After almost being driven into the sea, UN forces, made up largely of U.S. troops and commanded by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, counterattacked successfully and in September pushed the North Korean forces back across the border. Not content with this victory, the United States attempted to unify Korea by force, advancing almost to the borders of China and the Soviet Union. China, after its warnings were ignored, then entered the war, driving the UN forces back into South Korea. The battle line was soon stabilized along the 38th parallel, and armistice talks began on July 10, 1951, three months after Truman had relieved MacArthur for openly challenging U.S. policies. The talks dragged on fruitlessly, interrupted by outbreaks of fighting, until Eisenhower became president. The United States sustained some 142,000 casualties in this limited war, most of them occurring after China's entry.
In addition to militarizing the Cold War, the Korean conflict widened its field. The United States assumed responsibility for protecting Taiwan against invasion from mainland China. Additional military aid was extended to the French in Indochina. In December 1950 Truman called for a crash program of rearmament, not just to support the forces in Korea but especially to expand the U.S. presence in Europe. As a result defense expenditures rose to $53,600,000,000 in 1953, four times the pre-Korean level, and would decline only modestly after the armistice.
Monday, April 09, 2007
Deadline Approaching
The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim also indicated to the Bill Richardson delegation that as soon as they received the funds, they would allow IAEA officials back into the country--with the caveat that shutting down the Yongbyong reactor by Saturday would be "difficult." So I guess we'll have to wait and see what happens at the end of this week. Most likely it will be something like the US-Korea FTA process with a mad scramble at the end to put something together.
On a different note, there was an article on Ethiopia having bought arms from North Korea earlier this year with US consent. It was rather interesting and pointed out the US policy of turning a blind eye to allies who are cooperating with it.
When the Ice is Melting and Flowers are Starting to Blossom
At the same time, it strikes me that improvements have been largely one-dimensional, in that Japan's relationship with China has been improving significantly, while Tokyo's relationship with Seoul, though better than before, remains comparatively stagnant. It seems that Beijing is making a major effort to improve popular perceptions of Japan. One example that comes to mind is an upcoming CCTV documentary on Japan during the early 20th century, part of an effort to proliferate understanding and a more balanced presentation of the Japanese. Japan seems to be making appropriate strides to do its part, to "face up to its history," with one or two glaring exceptions aside.
The latest chapter in this unbalanced diplomatic initiative is Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan this week, where the two sides will continue to strengthen ties and attempt to make strides in addressing their mutual energy, environmental, and regional security interests.
Perhaps this bias is imagined. Perhaps it is the result of my Sino-centric academic eye. Perhaps it is completely accurate. Can anyone think of any major political strides taken to bolster the Japan-ROK relationship since Abe came to power? Does anyone think that developments in the China-Japan relationship are overstated on my part? Maybe I'm putting too much stock in generic activity. On the other hand, maybe China's economic prowess simply trumps anything Seoul has to offer Japan and Tokyo wants to capitalize.
From a different angle, I wonder if national identities in China and Korea play a role in the openness to developing close relations with Japan. While the two are without a doubt very nationalist, I think that China's nationalism has refocused itself in the present context.
Back in college, everything I read about China was how nationalism drove everything: retribution for a century of humiliation, restoring China to its once great status, etc. Well, guess what? Another decade of economic growth later, China's kinda done that from my perspective. The once somewhat stand-offish rising power, has not only continued to prosper and develop, but it has also begun to craft a role for itself in the international community as a great power. The "China threat" is becoming a "responsible stakeholder" on a "peaceful rise." Now better integrated into the international system, I think that China's nationalism has changed course. It's rise is no longer validated by its need to recover from its historical obstacles, but by its need to continue to develop and grow in the present.
I am not so confident saying the same of Korea's nationalism. This course has suggested to me that ROK remains very much held hostage by its troubled past. Certainly, division provides a demoralizing reminder of this difficult history, but nonetheless, Korea's nationalism, I believe, remains very much rooted in the past. This perhaps makes them less willing than the Chinese to engage Japan now that their neighbour has reached out.
I'm curious to hear what people think.
Sunday, April 08, 2007
HR 121 Petition
Saturday, April 07, 2007
Bad Terms both with North and South Koreas
NKorea blasts Japan for distorting history in wake of textbook revisions IHT, April 3
The Ministeral talks between South Korea and Japan also confirmed that there is a big rift between the two. (4th LD) S. Korea, Japan hold ministerial talks amid tension over history row Yonhap, March 31, and Long Way to Go: Foreign Ministers Reconfirm Seoul-Tokyo Distance Korea Times, April 2
And there seems to be an increasing domestic pressure on Korean politicians to take more hawkish stance towards Japan on this issue. Politicians criticized for lukewarm attitude toward Japan's history distortion, Yonhap, April 5. This article interestingly highlights the shift of focus among Korean politicians who used to fan anti-Japanese sentiment but now neglect the issue.
"In the past, South Korean politicians took the initiative in fanning anti-Japanese sentiment: They visited the Japanese Embassy in protest, adopted a resolution condemning Tokyo’s controversial moves and released a list of names of hundreds of Koreans who collaborated with colonial Japan..."I admit that we've been neglecting the issue," said an aid to Rep. Jeon Yeo-ok, a conservative voice in the GNP who is the author of the book “There is no Japan." The presidential election is the priority."
The Futility of the 6PT
AEI hosted this panel featuring Amb. Bolton, along with Nick Eberstadt and Dan Bloumenthal, to discuss (and for the most part disparage) the merits, or lack there of, of negotiating with North Korea. This issue will probably come up in class in a few weeks when we focus on North Korea, but I think that a preview never hurt anyone.
Amb. Bolton shaped the fundamental question at the heart of the debate. "Do you believe that North Korea will ever voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program?" If yes, then party on, Wayne, but if not, then the process is futile and potentially dangerous, as it allows Pyongyang to emerge from the corner that it has been backed into, and risks direct use of the weapons or transfer of the weapons to a terrorist group or criminal organization.
Bolton and Eberstadt both discuss how historically North Korea has consistently proven itself to be unreliable in negotiation, and to be committed to and politically dependent on a nuclear program for its survival (There is a great piece by Victor Cha in NBR's Strategic Asia 2004-2005; I've linked it here if you have the time to read it; Cha dubs Pyongyang's strategy as one of "receive (aid) and retain (nukes)" ). These factors, and the fact that the North is likely to miss the 60 day deadline this week, suggest that negotiations are a misguided strategy and do not serve U.S. interests. Bolton also notes that Yongbyon is potentially on its last legs, making it not all that considerable of a concession on Pyongyang's part. Finally, Bloumenthal adds some interesting points about how this negotiation process has hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance, what he believes should be Washington's strategic priority in East Asia, and also minimizes the importance of North Korean denuclearization. These elements further compromise American strategic interests in the region.
The issues raised in this panel bring up a lot of important questions, most notably the central question framed by Amb. Bolton. If you accept that North Korea sticks to a policy of "receive and retain," does the Kim regime really have any benefit to gain from long term cooperation with the int'l community and total denuclearization? If not, why would it voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program? On another note, is Pyongyang's nuclear test really that big of a deal? Was it the result of a "failure of U.S. policy"?
I personally find it hard to believe that the North would ever directly use a nuclear weapon against another state as the result would likely be the complete decimation of the country and the toppling of the Kim regime. I also find it hard to believe that weapons would be trafficked out of North Korea. For one thing, if I'm not mistaken, the North only has a handful of warheads (5 or 6?)and it needs all the help it can get from where I'm sitting. For another, this isn't the frontier regions of Pakistan we're talking about here. East Asia and the countries in it strike me as generally secure and well-policed areas. I'm skeptical that a nuclear weapon could be successfully smuggled out of the country, especially under conditions of enhanced scrutiny in the post-test world. At the same time, East Asia is notorious for human trafficking and drug trafficking problems, and the transfer of technology or nuclear know-how is not as far-fetched.
That being said, I firmly believe negotiations are necessary. It's all well and good to continue to push Pyongyang into a corner, but eventually you reach an equilibrium and can squeeze no more. I don't think that the top dogs in the North would be threatened by such a strategy. The humanitarian and social side-effects would be horrific, and the strategic pay-off would ultimately be nil.
Negotiations begin a process that goes far beyond simple denuclearization and eventually addresses the root causes of the issue, opening the door for peace and reconciliation on the Peninsula and in the region. This round of negotiations differs from previous experiences in that China has taken a much more active role since Pyongyang's nuclear test. This presence at the table and influence on Pyongyang could prove to be a deciding factor in the outcome of the 6PT.
In addition, the hold-up with the negotiations now does not strike me as North Korea being nit-picky or giving everyone the run-around. The other players have yet to live up to their end of the bargain, so why should the North?
I think I've written enough for one post. Congrats if you had the attention span to get all the way through.
Friday, April 06, 2007
Is the FTA Really A Done Deal?
We wondered in class how the FTA could have been passed without resolution on some of the more sensitive aspects of the deal (beef & autos, in particular). Perhaps it was my failure to read reports that covered the deal carefully, but it turns out that beef wasn't addressed in the FTA (yet may have been in a sort of side deal).
Apparently, the USTR framed the issue in a way that, in essence, passes the buck to the Congress with respect to beef. The AFP reports that the USTR expressed to its Korean counterparts the belief that the deal would not pass Congress if South Korea failed to completely reopen its market to US beef. (Seoul halted the importation of US beef due to fears about mad cow disease.)
The report quotes Deputy US Trade Representative Karan Bhatia as noting, "We have made very clear and have been very clear all along that we don't believe our Congress will feel comfortable approving this deal without the Korean beef market being fully reopened."
It seems as if there's disagreement, though, on exactly what measures the South Korean contingent agreed to take. Senator Max Baucus (D, Montana), head of the Senate finance committee, seems to think that the ROK made only a general promise to resolve the issue at some point in the future. Baucus then notes that nothing short of a complete lift on the ban will suffice and that he'll block movement of the deal through the Senate until Korea does so.
Not to be a skeptic, but here's a long, yet perhaps relevant aside from our friends at Beef.org (the National Cattlemen's Beef Association) that *might* shed some light on why Senator Baucus feels so strongly (is anyone else surprised at how dated this information is?):
"In terms of gross cash receipts, the $760 million of cattle marketings represents 44.8 percent of all agricultural marketings and 85 percent of livestock and poultry marketings for the most currently available year, 1992.....Including the meat processing sector, an estimated 21,700 jobs and $802.7 million of personal income are generated in Montana from the beef industry.....Montana is the eleventh largest cattle inventory state and the sixth largest beef cow state."
So, it looks like we've got our work cut out for us (isn't this what the FTA was supposed to take care of??!?) and a new deadline to work with before we can consider the deal that's done, well, done (for real this time). (Somebody stop me from saying "Mission Accomplished" here. Ooops.) President Bush's authority to expedite the agreement (Congress would have to approve or reject it, but can't alter it) expires at the end of June (after which the agreement would still have to be sent to Congress for approval). However, it seems some in the Congress will prevent it from even being considered pending the resolution of the beef issue.
I always find the interplay between domestic and international politics interesting. But, in this case, I think what we're seeing is a result of the simple fact that the FTA didn't resolve at least one of the issues I would have thought it would have had to address. Although the issue of beef wasn't addressed by the agreement (which Congress would not have been able to alter), it seems the folks on the Hill will still have their say.
I never quite got how the agreement could pass without something being done about beef & automobiles. Well, I guess it can't. But here's a question: by not including it in the agreement, is the trade in beef then subject to the vagaries of domestic politics in both nations as relations wax and wane in the future? Is this a wise move? Was this the only way to move forward on the FTA? Seems like the deal kind of misses the point then (settling the tough issues). Also, if you're a GOP'er, why give the Democrats some wiggle room here? Or are the Dems creating some where there really isn't any? Ugh.
Hey Professor Larsen...

Thursday, April 05, 2007
Sticking with the Theme...
Because of the ongoing dispute over the funds still in limbo, several officials involved with the talks, such as Wu Dawei, the chief Chinese negotiator, are expressing pessimism that the North will meet the deadline. Others, however, such as Japanese envoy Kenichiro Sasae seem focused less on the date itself, noting “Even if it is delayed, the important thing is to carry out what has been agreed and that is still possible.”
While I'm not particularly inspired by the delay, how the North is acting, or how the other parties are reacting, I am encouraged by what seems to be Mr. Sasae's appreciation of the larger picture.
The article is interesting, as well, because it provides some pretty granular detail as to what is holding the process up. It reports that authorities in Macao are in the process of contacting some 50 individuals who have accounts with BDA in order to obtain their approval to wire their money to the Bank of China in Beijing. Apparently, one of the account holders has passed away, as well, making matters worse (no beneficiary has been named).
The FT piece has a quote or two from Michael J. Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the NSC, holder of the Japan Chair at CSIS, and professor at Georgetown, that kind of snapped me out of a fog with regard to the whole point of the talks.
While many discussions of the hitch have centered on the technical issues involved in getting the DPRK its money, this exercise can't be about everyone asking North Korea just how high we should jump. Sure, the US and others have to hold up their end of the bargain. But I think most would agree that a good faith effort has been made to do so...to get the North its money. From the reporting I've seen in the media it at least seems that way. At some point, intentions have to count for something, right?
Some, of course, would point to the way the North has handled this and say the song has remained the same with regard to Pyongyang's negotiating (delaying) tactics, level of suspicion, and general obstinance. Others would say they are simply following the agreement word for word...in the most literal sense possible.
I'm not surprised, but I think the state of affairs speaks to just how incremental this process will have to be (if we're assuming all parties are even genuine in their efforts) to begin to chip away at the lack of trust that seems to permeate interactions between the North and the other 5 parties.
N.K. defectors form a new political group
Wednesday, April 04, 2007
Update on the Stalled 6 Party Talks
Essentially, Bank of China is reluctant to accept the funds because it fears a negative impact on it's credit rating. The U.S. designation of BDA as a "primary laundering concern," implies to Bank of China that the funds are illicit, thus making it reluctant to handle the money. The Chinese government has "encouraged" the Bank to accept the funds, but to no avail thus far. As a result, an electronic transfer that should have taken hours, has now stretched into weeks.
This implications of this delay are significant. Most importantly, Pyongyang has refused to come back to the negotiating table until the transaction is complete. This not only compromises future discussions but also the realization of already established benchmarks, namely, the shut down of the Yongbyon reactor by mid-April. This would be a blow to the 6 Party Talks and the denuclearization process, not so much within the negotiation process per se, but more in terms of external perceptions in participant countries' domestic political circles over the feasibility of such a diplomatic endeavor and the reliability of North Korea to live up to its end of the bargain.
Seoul and Beijing, North Korea's strongest "supporters" at the table are said to be working hard resolve the issue. We shall see what happens...
Dolphins!

Here's the world's tallest man , Bao Xishun, (7' 9''), with his 42'' arm down a dolphin's throat as he tries to remove pieces of plastic from its stomach. (The dolphins had eaten parts of the extremely poor quality pool they were being kept in at an aquarium in Liaoning province.)
Here's another shot showing him standing next to some other folks for reference.
And here is a shot of Bao with his new wife, who is 5'6'' and half his age (28). No worries, though, she's from his hometown. PS-The dolphin was quoted as saying, "Click, click, beep, clickety clack, clickety click, tick, beep." My dolphinese is a little rusty, but roughly translated, it comes across as, "Owwww, there's a frickin' 42'' arm down my throat!!"
Tuesday, April 03, 2007
Bill Richardson to head delegation to North Korea
Erin in her post asks of North Korea's perception of the Japanese. I think so far North Korea is still pretty much closed to us, and it is hard to know the North Koreans' view. But with the increase of foreign visits to that land, North Korea will get opened. The international community should and is able, I believe, to play the role to open up North Korea.
McDonalds and the DPRK
More seriously, the article, written by a Korean-American teacher working at a school with North Korean refugees in Seoul, looks at the growing North Korean refugee issue in South Korea and comments on the lack of infrastructure (and lack of interest beyond a superficial level) for dealing with it. Despite public sentiment supporting policies of engagement, little is done for North Korean refugees in South Korea. Instead, most aid goes directly to North Korea.
Clearly, education has been a powerful, transformative force equalizing Korean society, even under colonial rule and especially since liberation. Korea and particularly the Korean education system have benefited from the homogeneity and uniformity of Korean society; less diversity breads less conflict. However, Korea’s economic development combined with the force of globalization, has brought in and continues to bring in non-Koreans in increasing numbers. This new immigration has strained (or threatens to strain) the education (and other social) systems, often prompting racialized, ethno-centric and nationalistic responses.
As education is a key socializing institution, it is a place for North Korean refugees to learn not only important skills but what it means to be South Korean, through rituals, language, practices, etc. Re-socialization is unimaginably difficult, especially given the horrors North Korean refugees faced as children. This difficulty is compounded by a lack of an awareness of and infrastructure to provide support. Given the uniformity in South Korean society, schools provide an arena where North Koreans (and other non-Koreans) are socialized as "others", resulting in high drop-out rates and an inability to function into South Korean citizens.
As Korea has transformed from being an oppressed country (victimized by Japanese colonization and poverty) to the 11th largest economy in the world, it has gained the power to oppress. This power manifests itself in othering non-Koreans, including non-South Koreans.
Living in Korea, I witnessed Korean-American friends experience “not being Korean enough” in Korea. By no means do Korean-Americans lack the same power as North Koreans in South Korea. If anything, Korean-Americans possess a great deal of social and economic power. Still, the differentiation exists. Like the article mentions that North Korean refugees experience feelings of exclusion, I think this phenomenon extends to the larger Korean diaspora. To some extent, I think it’s inexperience with dealing with diversity. Still, the Confucian emphasis on bloodlines and nationalization of Korean ethnic identity perpetuates racism. Another aspect is South Korea becoming more powerful.
Korean Sons Sent from Japan to North Korea
“Four Brothers Sent to Prison Camp for Praising Michelangelo.”
The description of horrible prison camp is sad but not surprising. What fascinates me is the fact that many Japanese-born North Korean sons were sent to North Korea by their parents.
A recent Japanese documentary film "Dear Pyonyang" also depicts a father who sent his sons to North Korea. (an English review here.) The film was directed by the daughter (or sister of the sons who are now in North Korea).
This is one of my numerous research topics for the future. I don't think anyone has done systematic research on this (please let me know if you know any work on this). What is the institutional setting for this (apparently common) custom to ship boys to North Korea? Is/was there a pragmatic function in this or purely ideological? What is the history of this?
Propaganda at its Finest
"The Korean people seethed with anger and wept with sorrow over the loss of their nationhood. Countless patriots could not bear the tragedy that had befallen on Korea and opted to end their lives than to live under the Japanese yoke. They chose honorable death over shameful submission to the much despised Japanese."
It's also interesting, I find, that even after he describes the various physical tortures inflicted by the Japanese on the Korean people, the most horrible crimes committed by the Japanese were taking away their language and changing of the names, as well as changing the diet. In other words, in the North Korean (or nationalist?) conception, physical torture of individuals, or even death, falls far short of the horrors of having your culture or national identity stripped from you. And death is far better than submission, let alone collaboration.
Kim's 10 point proposal for reunification is also interesting in terms of looking at North Korean nationalism. Kim states: "All the members of the nation should link their individual destiny with that of the nation, love their nation passionately and unite with the single desire to defend the independence of the nation." The Korean nation is still imagined to incorporate all Koreans, not just those in North Korea, and I could be wrong, but to me this indicates a doubt on the North Koreans part as to the dedication of South Koreans to the cause of the nation.
I am curious if anyone knows how the average North Korean feels about the Japanese? How much of this propaganda do you internalize? I would think it's difficult to avoid or ignore, and when you're a child, if you're taught nothing else, that would make it harder. But I have a feeling these questions will not be answered until something drastic changes in North Korea.
Diplomatic Momentum from US-ROK FTA to Aid Japan-ROK FTA?
I'm guessing these meetings must have been planned in advance, but either way, in light of the recent US-ROK FTA, there's one thing we know for sure: the men and women of the South Korean Foreign Ministry haven't been sleeping much lately!
The New China News Agency (Xinhua), Seoul bureau, reports that South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso concluded a two-day meeting yesterday. The outcome was generally positive and both sides agreed to work to improve bilateral relations and push for progress with respect to the 6PT. However, *in addition to the usual diplomatic back and forth*, there were 3 statements I found interesting (Thank Tan'gun!).
First, Aso suggested the resumption of talks on an FTA between the two nations (6 rounds have been held since December 2003, but they've been frozen since November 2004). Also important in light of recent events, Aso reiterated that the Japanese government stands by the Kono statement. Both sides have also agreed to hold "high-level security talks" this coming May.
This is the kind of stuff Foreign Ministers do...they Foreign Ministrate, so it shouldn't really be shocking.
A few thoughts, though:
1) I think the fact that bilateral ties continue to make progress even in spite of PM Abe's recent statements bodes well and speaks to some level of health and stability in the South Korea-Japan relationship.
2) This is the way I'd like to see the US have an impact in the region: encourage progress by positive examples. You don't even need to make statements...you lead by example. (I'm not making the assumption that the US-ROK FTA inspired talk of a ROK-Japan FTA, I'm just saying I'm happy to see us advocate free trade by doing it, not just preaching it to others.)
3) I can guess, but don't know for a fact, that the FMs of both countries are working their magic under Executive guidance.
That they continue to find areas in which they can work together seems then, to me, to speak to the larger agendas of their respective governments...and thus to represent a measure of optimism with respect to the general importance and hope for bilateral relations in both Seoul & Tokyo.
Anyway, after reading my own post, it seems I've somehow caught a case of optimism. See what happens when you expose an analyst to too much sunshine!!!?
answer for Larry's question in class
Monday, April 02, 2007
Does Anyone Know How To Say 'Dokdo' in French?
Wrapping up class last week or perhaps a few weeks ago, we had a good chuckle about Dokdo (in terms of it being an uninhabitable rock, not in terms of the larger issues at the center of the debate). There seemed to be a consensus about the validity of the debate surrounding EEZs and the legitimate economic issues that are sometimes attached to territorial disputes.
I don't know about you, my esteemed classmates, but I left with the feeling that there had to be parallels for the Dokdo dispute elsewhere. After spending a little quality time with "The Google" and "The Internets," (yes, Dick Cheney's and the one we all use) I found this Yahoo (AP) piece that hit so close to home I'm amazed I'd never heard of it before in discussions of Dokdo (keep reading...you'll see why later).
So, not being a nefarious Canadian ultra-nationalist or a geography buff, I'd never heard of Hans Island. Anyone? Anyone? Bueller? Bueller? Bueller? Well, it's apparently a rock about a half square mile large (yes, you read that right...one half square mile...check out the pic on wikipedia...you can see the whole thing) somewhere in between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Greenland (Danish-ruled).
Needless to say, it's completely barren and totally uninhabited (not counting sporadic flag-planters). It's also, of course, (insert drumroll here) the subject of a vigorous territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark, the happiest nation on earth. (As the AP piece points out, both are NATO nations.)
Although, I'll admit, there's clearly no comparison in terms of the nationalist sentiment involved, I think the parallel is fairly interesting in other ways. You won't be surprised to find out that the Canadians and the Danish aren't fighting over a useless rock that has no commerical value. Big shock here...some think there are significant amounts of oil, gas, diamonds, minerals, and fish & maritime resources located in the region, if not nearby.
Others see Hans Island as key to newly emerging shipping routes (more on this later) that could open the North Pole region for "easy navigation for five months a year" and cut "sailing time from Germany to Alaska by 60 percent, going through Russia's Arctic instead of the Panama Canal." With significant climate change, "the Northwest Passage could open through the channels of Canada's Arctic islands and shorten the voyage from Europe to the Far East."
As such, there has been a back and forth over the island that might sound familiar. From the AP piece:
"In 1984, Denmark's minister for Greenland affairs, Tom Hoeyem, caused a stir
when he flew in on a chartered helicopter, raised a Danish flag on the island, buried a bottle of brandy at the base of the flagpole and left a note saying "Welcome to the Danish island." The dispute erupted again two years ago when Canadian Defense Minister Bill Graham set foot on the rock while Canadian troops hoisted the Maple Leaf flag. Denmark sent a letter of protest to Ottawa, while Canadians and Danes took out competing Google ads, each proclaiming sovereignty over the rock 680 miles south of the North Pole. Some Canadians even called for a boycott of Danish pastries."
Sound like any island dispute we know? I love the Google ads...and the pastry boycott.
Which leads to another thing I thought was interesting. While some in our group suggested (in jest) that the "global warmings" might resolve the Dokdo issue (the idea being that rising sea levels would simply covering the island up), in the case of the Arctic, the "warmings" seem to be making such disputes all the more tense. According to the story, sections of ice thought to be solid for the next 100 years are apparently now forecasted to melt within the next 10-15.
As the ice caps melt, navigation paths open up. Easier navigation makes the extraction of petroleum and other valuables first possible, then cheaper and more efficient (significant considering that, according to the story "the U.S. Geological Survey estimates the Arctic has as much as 25 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and gas.") Not surprisingly, the US, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway are rushing to firm up their claims to territory in the region.
Some seem pretty sensitive to facets of the dispute, too. The Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, is quoted in the story as having promised to put military icebreakers in the area "to assert our sovereignty and take action to protect our territorial integrity." Sound familiar?
I guess my points (finally, you're probably thinking) are: 1) the Dokdo issue is far from unique, 2) I'm interested how concrete an impact environmental change can have on politics, and 3) these disputes aren't going away...they're going to get worse, so it seems finding a way to solve them is thus becoming increasingly important.
OK...enough for now. (I have to say I'm pretty proud of myself here: not one Canada joke! Not one! And given the material to work with in this one, that's saying something!) =)
Airbrushing History
There was another article that was critical on China's policy of "airbrushing" its own history, saying that it was no different from Japan. "Young Chinese tend to know next to nothing about their country's own conquests, or even about atrocities committed in living memory by their own government. What they are taught is what Japan's nationalists seek to teach: their own essential goodness."
So in the end, is Japan and China no different in how they are trying to portray/shape its past history? Including Korea, these three countries, like any other country, have an agenda in how they want their national history portrayed and what should be emphasized. As we saw last week, Korea has its own problems with an education system that teaches hatred towards the Japanese (I'm generalizing here). And I'm sure there are other issues that are being airbrushed or contained by the Korean government. So how can "historical correctness" be done when everyones version of the truth is different and the government has a stake in portraying a certain type of history?
FTA Agreement Reached!
In another article by the International Herald Tribune, which goes into more detail, the contentious beef and rice issues have been resolved by Washington dropping its demands on the South Korean government's rice subsidies in exchange for Seoul resuming imports of American beef after the World Organization for Animal Health declares U.S. beef safe in a ruling next month. It's interesting to note however that the Kaeseong products were not mentioned at all.
All that is left is for Congress and the South Korean Parliment to ratify the deal, which will be another huge hurdle to overcome. There are high political costs for both sides with tens of thousands of South Korean farmers expected to lose their jobs and the U.S. manufacturers to face increasing competition. Overall, consumers on both sides are expected to benefit though.
Sunday, April 01, 2007
Sad Thing about the Korean Language
Ignorance of Chinese is Ignorance of Korean, Chosun Ilbo, March 14 2007.
Obviously it would be much easier for me to learn the language if they used Chinese characters, but even apart from my personal preference, literary Chinese was an international language among Asian countries for a long time. I really hope they start teaching Chinese characters at school again.

